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Abstract—In this paper, we study the impact of correlated
fading on the secrecy performance of multiple decode-and-
forward (DF) relaying with outdated relay selection. It is assumed
that the information transmission, assisted by N DF relays from
the source to the destination, can be overheard by an eavesdrop-
per. Particularly, we consider the realistic scenario where the
eavesdropper’s and the main channels are correlated. In order
to enhance the network security, the best relay is selected among
N available DF relays to assist the secure transmission. Due to
the time-varying channel environments, we note that the selected
relay may be outdated. In order to study the impact of both
channel correlation and outdated relay selection on the secrecy
performance, we first derive an analytical expression for the
secrecy outage probability (SOP). Also, we derive the asymptotic
expression for the SOP in the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER) regime. Numerical results are provided to demonstrate
the correctness of our analytical expressions.
Index Terms—Secure communications, correlated fading chan-
nels, outdated relay selection, secrecy diversity order.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature, wireless transmission may be
overheard by eavesdroppers in the network, and the severe
issue of information leakage arises [1]. To prevent the wiretap,
encryption algorithms and the concept of physical-layer secu-
rity (PLS) have been presented in the literature. Specifically,
in the pioneering work of Wyner [2], the wiretap channel
model was firstly proposed. Several researchers extended this
approach to fading channels and studied important metrics,
such as the secrecy capacity and the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) [3]–[7]. Furthermore, as relaying is a promising tech-
nique for the next-generation communication networks, it is of
vital importance to investigate the PLS of relaying systems.
For amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
relaying, the secrecy performance has been studied by deriv-
ing analytical expression of SOP in [8]–[10]. Moreover, the
asymptotic SOP with high main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER)
was provided, in order to obtain insights on the system design.
In most of the works in the open literature, the eavesdrop-
ping and the main channels are assumed to be statistically
independent. However, this ideal assumption may not hold in
practice due to reasons such as antenna deployment, proximity
of the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, and scattering
environments. The impact of channel correlation between the
main and eavesdropping links on the secrecy performance was
studied in [11], [12], where it was found that the channel
correlation is harmful to the transmission security, especially
in the low MER region. In order to enhance the security, op-
portunistic selection is an effective technique, which exploits
the channel fluctuation between antennas, users and relays [9],
[13]. The selection can be implemented in a centralized or
distributed manner through dedicated feedback links, which
may take some time to complete. However, in time-varying
environments, channels may vary from the instant of selection
to that of actual data transmission. This results in the selection
based on outdated channel state information (CSI) [14] and the
best relay is not always selected [15], [16].
In this paper, we investigate the PLS of multi-relay net-
works, assuming channel correlation between the main and
eavesdropping links. The information transmission, assisted
by N DF relays from the source to the destination, may be
overheard by the eavesdropper in the network. To strengthen
the secure transmission, the best relay is selected among N
relays, which is however based on the outdated CSI in time-
varying channel environments. We study the impact of both
channel correlation and outdated relay selection by deriving
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Fig. 1. A two-phase secure multiple DF relaying network.
the analytical and asymptotic expressions for the SOP. From
the asymptotic result, we find that the secrecy diversity order
is equal to the number of relays N , only if perfect CSI is
assumed; otherwise it becomes unity. Moreover, the channel
correlation does not affect the secrecy diversity order, but it can
strengthen the secure transmission in the high MER region.
Notations: CN (0; 2) denotes a circularly symmetric com-
plex Gaussian random variable (RV) with zero mean and
variance 2. We use fX() to represent the probability density
function (PDF) of the RV X . In addition, I0(x) is the modified
Bessel function of the first kind of order zero [17], Pr[] returns
the probability. We use hA;B to denote the channel parameter
of the A–B link.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1 shows the system model of a two-phase secure
multiple DF relays network, where the information trans-
mission from the source, S, to the destination, D, can be
overheard by the eavesdropper, E. When S is far from D
and E, the direct links are hard to be established, due to
severe shadowing. Thus, the data communication can only be
performed through the relaying links. There are no direct links
from S to D and E, and the information transmission are only
performed through the N relays fRnj1  n  Ng. The best
relay is chosen among N available relays to assist the secure
transmission. However, the selection may be outdated in time-
varying channel environments, and the best relay is not always
chosen. In addition, due to reasons such as antenna deployment
and radio scattering, the channels at the receivers D and E are
correlated, i.e., hRn;D is correlated with hRn;E . Due to the size
limitation, the nodes in the network are equipped with only
one antenna, and all links experience time-varying Rayleigh
fading. In what follows, we discuss the two-phase secure data
transmission process and the relay selection criterion for the
considered system.
Suppose that the relay, Rn, is used for the two-phase secure
data transmission. In the first phase, S transmits the signal, xS ,
to Rn with transmit power P . The Rn receives,
yRn =
p
PhS;RnxS + nRn ; (1)
where hS;Rn  CN (0; ) denotes the channel coefficient of
the S–Rn link, and nRn  CN (0; 2) is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay Rn. If the relay, Rn,
can correctly decode the message from the source, i.e., it can
support a target data rate,
Rt  1
2
log2

1 +
P jhS;Rn j2
2

: (2)
Then, the relay in the second phase forwards the message to
D with transmit power P . Accordingly, D and E receive,
yD =
p
PhRn;DxS + nD; (3)
yE =
p
PhRn;ExS + nE ; (4)
where hRn;D  CN (0; 1) and hRn;E  CN (0; 2) are the
channel coefficients of the Rn–D and Rn–E links, respectively.
Accordingly, the average channel gains of hRn;D and hRn;E
are represented by 1 and 2, respectively. The noise terms
nD  CN (0; 2) and nE  CN (0; 2) are the AWGN at D
and E, respectively.
We use un = jhS;Rn j2, vn = jhRn;Dj2 and wn = jhRn;E j2
to represent the channel gains of the S–Rn, Rn–D and Rn–E
links, respectively. The secrecy outage occurs when the data
rate difference between the main and eavesdropping links falls
below a target secrecy data rate Rs, i.e.,
1
2
log2

1 +
P
2
vn

  1
2
log2

1 +
P
2
wn

< Rs; (5)
which is equivalent to
1 + ~Pvn
1 + ~Pwn
< s; (6)
where ~P = P=2 denotes the transmit SNR, and s = 22Rs
is the secrecy SNR threshold.
To enhance the transmission security, we select the best
relay to strengthen the secure data transmission. Let 
 denote
the candidate set of relays that can successfully decode the
message from the source. Then based on the main channels
only1, the relay selection is performed to choose the best relay
Rn among 
,
n = argmax
n2

vn; (7)
which maximizes the received SNR at the destination D.
III. CHANNEL CORRELATION AND OUTDATED RELAY
SELECTION
In this work, we consider correlated channels between the
receiver D and E, which is characterized by the conditional
PDF [12]
fwnjvn(wjv) =
I0

2
1 
q
vw
12

(1  )12 e
 
v
1
+ w
2
1  ; (8)
where  2 [0; 1] is the power correlation coefficient. Specifi-
cally, for  = 0, vn is independent of wn, while for  = 1,
completely linear correlation is assumed.
Besides the channel correlation, the outdated relay selection
has a significant impact on the network security. In practice,
1The instantaneous channel parameters of eavesdropping links are not
involved in the relay selection criterion, since they are generally hard to obtain
in practice.
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the selection of (7) can be implemented in a distributed or
centralized manner, through some dedicated feedback channels
[9]. However, due to the limited feedback resources, the
channels may vary from the instant of relay selection to that of
actual data transmission in time-varying channel environments.
Let ~vn and vn denote the channels of Rn–D at the instants
of relay selection and actual data transmission, respectively.
The outdated selection can be characterized by the conditional
PDF fvn j~vn (vj~v) [14],
fvn j~vn (vj~v) =
1
(1  )1 e
  ~v+v
(1 )1 I0
 2pv~v
(1  )1

; (9)
where  2 [0; 1] represents the outdated degree of relay
selection. In particular,  = 1 corresponds to the case where
the selection is based on the perfect CSI, while  = 0
represents the completely outdated relay selection.
In the following, we will study the impact of channel
correlation and outdated relay selection on the network se-
crecy performance, by providing the analytical and asymptotic
expressions of secrecy outage probability.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
A. Analytical Expression
The set 
 may have K(K = 1; 2;    ; N) candidates that
can correctly decode the message from the source. Hence, we
can express the SOP of the considered system as
Pout =
NX
K=1

N
K

Pr
h
~Pu1  t;    ; ~PuK  t;
~PuK+1 < t;    ; ~PuN < t; 1 +
~Pvn
1 + ~Pwn
< s
i
; (10)
where t = 22Rt   1 denotes the SNR threshold of successful
decoding at the relay. The analytical SOP for the multiple
secure relaying with channel correlation and outdated relay
selection as
Pout =
NX
K=1

N
K

e 
Kt
~P
 
1  e  t~P N K 1  KX
k=1
TX
m=0
mX
i=0
iX
j=0
Ckmdm;ij(m+ j)!(b1s + b2)
 (m+j+1)
!
; (11)
where T is a given number of terms related to , ‘!’ denotes
the factorial operation, and
b1 =
 k
k(1  ) +  +

1  
 1
1
; b2 =
1
(1  )2 ; (12)
Ckm =

K
k

k( 1)k 1
k(1  ) + 
m
(1  )2m+1(12)m+1(m!)2 ;
(13)
and
dm;ij =
m!
i!

i
j

e b1(s 1)= ~P
bm i+11
js
 s   1
~P
i j
: (14)
Proof: Since the random variable un is independent of
vn and wn , we can rewrite Pout in (10) as
Pout =
NX
K=1

N
K

Pr
h
~Pu1  t;    ; ~PuK  t;
~PuK+1 < t;    ; ~PuN < t
i
Pr
h 1 + ~Pvn
1 + ~Pwn
< s
i
(15)
=
NX
K=1

N
K

e 
Kt
~P
 
1  e  t~P N K Pr h 1 + ~Pvn
1 + ~Pwn
< s
i
| {z }
JK
;
(16)
where fun(u) =
1
e
  u is used and the probability JK
denotes the conditional SOP with given K active relays.
From the selection criterion in (7) and the conditional PDF
of fvn j~vn (vj~v) in (9), the PDF of vn is [14]
fvn (v) =
KX
k=1

K
k

k( 1)k 1
1[k(1  ) + ]e
  kv
[k(1 )+]1 : (17)
From (8) and (17), we obtain the joint PDF of vn and wn
as,
fvn ;wn (v; w) = fwn jvn (wjv)fvn (v)
=
KX
k=1

K
k

k( 1)k 1
12(1  )[k(1  ) + ]I0
 2
1  
r
vw
12

 e  kv[k(1 )+]1 ( v1+ w2 ) 11  : (18)
Note that the Bessel function I0(x) can be expressed by
infinite series as [17]
I0(x) =
1X
m=0
x2m
4m(m!)2

TX
m=0
x2m
4m(m!)2
; (19)
where the truncation error decays exponentially with T , i.e.,
T [12]. Hence with an efficient number of terms, we can
obtain an accurate approximation for I0(x). In this paper,
we set the truncation error to a very small value of 10 10,
leading to T = round
   10
log10 

. In the following, we ignore
the approximation error, and re-express fvn ;wn (v; w) as
fvn ;wn (v; w) =
KX
k=1
TX
m=0
Ckmv
mwme b1ve b2w; (20)
where b1, b2 and Ckm are defined in (12)-(13). From (20), we
can compute JK as
JK = Pr
 
vn <
s   1
~P
+ swn

(21)
=
Z 1
0
Z s 1
~P
+sw
0
fvn ;wn (v; w)dvdw (22)
= 1 
KX
k=1
TX
m=0
mX
i=0
iX
j=0
Ckmdm;ij(m+ j)!
 (b1s + b2) (m+j+1): (23)
By applying the result of JK into (16), we can obtain the
analytical SOP given in (11).
Note that the obtained analytical SOP in (11) consists of
elementary functions only, and hence is easily to be evaluated.
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B. Asymptotic Expression
To obtain insights on the system design, we now investigate
the asymptotic SOP in the high MER. The asymptotic Pout
for the multiple secure relaying with channel correlation and
outdated relay selection is given by
Pout '
8>>>><>>>>:
N !
 (1  )s

N
; If  = 1
(1  )s

 
NX
k=1

N
k

k( 1)k 1
k(1  ) + 
!
; If  < 1
;
(24)
where  = 1=2 is the MER.
Proof: With a large transmit power P , we can approxi-
mate Pout as
Pout ' JN ' Pr
  vn
wn
< s

: (25)
Let z = vnwn , and then the PDF of z is derived as
fz(z) =
Z 1
0
wfvn ;wn (wz;w)dw (26)
=
NX
k=1

N
k

k( 1)k 1
12(1  )[k(1  ) + ]

kz
[k(1 )+]1 +
 
z
1
+ 12

1
1 h
kz
[k(1 )+]1 +
 
z
1
+ 12

1
1 
2
  4z(1 )212
i3=2 ;
(27)
where [17, eq. (6.623.2)] is applied in the last equality. For
high MER with 1  2, we can approximate fz(z) as
fz(z) '
NX
k=1

N
k

( 1)k 1(1  )[k(1  ) + ]
f+ k(1  )z + z[k(1  ) + ]g2 :
(28)
Using (28), we can approximate Pout as
Pout '
Z s
0
fz(z)dz; (29)
and obtain the asymptotic SOP expression in (24), where we
apply the approximation of (1+ x) 1 =
PN
k=0( 1)kxk [17].
From the asymptotic result in (24), we conclude the follow-
ing remarks on the network security:
Remark 1: For a given number of relays, the network
secrecy diversity order depends on the outdated degree of relay
selection, but not on the channel correlation.
Remark 2: The network secrecy diversity order is equal to
N when  = 1, indicating that the network security can be
rapidly enhanced by increasing the number of relays in the
perfect CSI environments.
Remark 3: As long as the relay selection is outdated, the
network secrecy diversity order degenerates to unity. This is
because that a wrong relay selection due to outdated CSI limits
the whole network secrecy performance.
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus the transmit power P .
Remark 4: The channel correlation between the main and
eavesdropping channels is beneficial to the transmission secu-
rity in high MER region2. With higher channel correlation, the
destination has more information about the channel fluctuation
of eavesdropping links. In particular, for the completely linear
correlation with  = 1, the fluctuation of eavesdropping
channels is completely accordance with that of main channels
and hence the destination has the perfect information about the
channel fluctuation of eavesdropping links, making vn=wn
equal to 1=2. This helps the network suppress the wiretap
perfectly, leading to a zero SOP.
V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical and simulation
results to verify the presented studies. All links in the network
experience Rayleigh fading, and we adopt the path-loss model
with exponent of four to measure the average channel gains of
main links, where the path loss exponent of four is valid for
suburban areas [18]. Without loss of generality, we normalize
the distance between the source and destination to unity, where
the relays are in between of them. Let D denote the distance
between the source and relays, and accordingly,  = D 4 and
1 = (1   D) 4 are set. The target data rate Rt of the first
hop is 1 bps/Hz, and hence the associated t is 3. The secrecy
data rate Rs is 0.2 bps/Hz, so that the secrecy SNR threshold
s is 1.32.
Fig. 2 demonstrates the numerical and simulated secrecy
outage probabilities versus the transmit power P , where N =
3,  = 20dB andD = 0:5. Several cases of channel correlation
are considered with  = 0:3, 0:5 and 0:7. Both perfect and
outdated CSI environments are studied with  = 1:0 and
0:5, respectively. As observed from the figure, for different
values of  and , the analytical result matches well with
the simulation one, and the asymptotic result converges to
the exact one when P is large. This validates the derived
analytical and asymptotic expressions of the SOP. Moreover,
2Note that in the low MER region, the channel correlation is however
harmful to the secure transmission [11], [12].
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION 5
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
MER (dB)
Se
cr
ec
y o
ut
ag
e 
pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
 
 
Analysis
Asymptotic
Simulation
Analysis
Asymptotic
Simulation
ρ=0.1:
ρ=0.5:
P=40 dB
D=0.5
σ=1
η=1
η=0.5
N=2
N=2N=3N=3
N=2
N=3
N=1
Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus MER.
in both perfect and outdated CSI environments, the secrecy
performance becomes better with larger , as higher channel
correlation helps the destination have more information about
the channel fluctuation of eavesdropping links. The secrecy
performance also improves with larger , as better CSI helps
select the best relay to assist the secure transmission. Further-
more, the secrecy performance improves with larger P . But
the improvement is saturated in high P region, as the fixed
MER becomes the bottleneck of the secrecy performance.
Fig. 3 illustrates the secrecy outage probability versus MER
with different values of  and , where P = 40dB and N
varies from 1 to 3. We can see from this figure that for
different values of N ,  and , the analytical result fits well
with the simulation one, and the asymptotic result converges
to the simulation one in the high MER region. Moreover,
only the value of  affects the curve slopes, but  does not.
This indicates that the secrecy diversity order depends on the
outdated degree of relay selection, but not on the channel
correlation. In particular, the curves are in parallel with each
other for different relay numbers when  = 0:5, indicating that
the system secrecy diversity order is unity for different values
of  as long as the selection is outdated. On the contrast, the
curve slope is proportional to N in the perfect CSI with  = 1,
indicating that the system full secrecy diversity order can be
achieved for different values of . Such observations validate
the insights from the asymptotic expression of the SOP.
Fig. 4 depicts the impact of D on the secrecy outage
probability with N = 3 and P = 40dB, where " = 1 and
D varies from 0:1 to 0:9. Several cases of channel correlation
and outdated relay selection are considered with  = 0:1; 0:5
and 0.7, and =0.5 and 1. We can find that for different
values of  and , the analytical result matches well with
the simulation one for the wide range of D. Moreover, the
secrecy performance improves when D increases, due to the
improved quality of the main channel and the increasing
MER. In further, the secrecy performance improves with larger
 and . This is because that higher channel correlation
helps the destination have more information about the channel
fluctuation of eavesdropping links, and better CSI helps select
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Fig. 4. Impact of D on the secrecy outage probability.
the best relay to assist the secure transmission.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secure relaying with N
DF relays, where the main and eavesdropping channels are
correlated. The relay selection was performed to choose one
best relay to assist the secure transmission, which is however
maybe outdated. We studied the impact of channel correlation
and outdated relay selection on the secrecy performance by de-
riving the analytical SOP as well as the asymptotic expression
with high MER. From the asymptotic SOP, we found that the
channel correlation does not affect the secrecy diversity order,
but can be beneficial to the transmission security. Importantly,
we confirmed that the full secrecy diversity order of N is
achieved only when the selection is based on the perfect CSI.
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